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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
WERNER KIEPE,
Plaintiff-Appellant and
Cross Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

10767

' ELI D. LECHEMINANT,
Defendant-Respondent and
Cross Appellant.

1

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF AND
BRIEF ON CROSS APPEAL
Appeal from the judgment of the Third District
Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable Marcellus
K. Snow, Judge.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action involving the operation of a
partnership business for a period of thirteen months
covering the period of time between the dissolution
of the partnership and the final winding up of the
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partnership business between Appellant and Respondent.
DISPOSITION OF CASE MADE IN
LOWER COURT
Respondent agrees with the disposition of the
case in the Lower Court as stated by Appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts
related by Appellant with the following exception:

It is presumed that Appellant intended to use
the word Appellant in the last paragraph of page 4,
line 5 of his brief.
Respondent does not agree with the statement
of overcharges to customers made by Respondent.
Were this appeal from the final judgment, then that
part of the Appellant's statement of facts pertaining to the original case resulting in the judgment
of March 12, 1964 not herein objected to might be
in order, but the only record of the case on which
this appeal is taken is that made subsequent to the
judgment entered March 12, 1964. To go behind this
record is unimportant and simply confuses the facts
as to the real issue on this appeal.
Appellant states that the partners continued to
operate the business of the partnership in the same
manner they had done prior to notice of dissolution.

3

In this we do not fully agree. The fact as shown by
the record is that while the partners continued on
in the same office, Appellant took into his possession and under his control, the appraisal business
and records, claiming those assets as his own and
not partnership assets and Appellant conducted his
own independent appraisal business, he did not intend that Respondent participate in the income,
therefrom. Respondent carried on the mortgage loan
and insurance business of the partnership, as a partnership operation from which Appellant at all times
participated in the income just as Appellant did
prior to the dissolution of the partnership. Appellant
put no time into partnership operation but Appellant devoted the whole of his time to his appraisal
business. The only question before the court is what
is the equitable basis under which the parties operated for a period of thirteen months, from the date
of dissolution through the winding up period to
the final breaking off date. The attention of the
court is directed to the fact that this phase of the
case was not made an issue by the pleadings. Contrary to the contention of Appellant the trial court
did retain jurisdiction, after having entered its judgment on the case for the purpose of settling the controversy which had arisen between the parties as to
the thirteen month period of time when the parties
could not resolve their differences. The Order from
which the appeal is taken was initiated not by any
pleadings but upon application of Respondent for an
Order to Show Cause why Appellant should not be
found in contempt of court for having failed to com-
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ply with the judgment of the court which was made
and entered on March 12, 1964. At this hearing, on
Respondent's application, no pleadings were filed but
both parties initiated the matter of accountings for
the thirteen month period subsequent to the date of
dissolution.
The attention of the court is directed to the fact
that when the trial court stated that no compensation would be allowed either party for services
during the thirteen month period, the court had not
considered nor allowed compensation to be paid to
Ruth Barlow and R. L. Christensen, and charged as
a partnership expense, neither had the court allowed
compensation to Appellants accountant, Mr. Pinnock, as a partnership expense.
At page 6 of Appellant's Brief Appellant states
that at the conclusion of the evidence, the purport of
the evidence was discussed with counsel, during
which counsel for Respondent makes the following
statement:
I said if they would be willing to invoke
the partnership agreement all the way down
the line, we would be willing to do that. But
they want to omit the renewal insurance and
that means that much more disadvantage to
us. (R. 244)

The Court then stated:
All right. The Court will adopt the suggestion of Mr. Backman that we go all the w.aY
down the line** *. Neither partner will receive
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any special compensation /or services during
this interim period, and all of the expenses by
whichever department incurred or by whom
will be lumped together and deducted from the
profit and loss account, if there is sufficient
in there, and the balance shall be distributed
equally between the partners. I won't need to
take it under advisement, and you can proceed
accordingly and wind up today if you want.
(R. 245)
The difficulty is that the court did not invoke
the partnership agreement all the way down the line
in that the court allowed the compensation paid to
Ruth Barlow and R. L. Christensen to be charged as
partnership expense. The partnership agreement
provided that mutual consent of the partners was
necessary to employ anyone on behalf of the partnership (R. 174). The Respondent told Appellant
that he would not pay Ruth Barlow if Appellant
employed her.
It is to be noted that no objection was made to
the introduction of evidence introduced by Respondent at the hearing had on February 13, 1964 as to
special services rendered by Respondent during the
winding up period in Respondents having preserved
the mortgage loan asset of the partnership (R. 164175).

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE JUDGMENT THAT DEFENDANT IS
AWARDED THE SUM OF $2,500.00 FOR SERV-
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ICES FOR A PERIOD OF THIRTEEN MONTHS
SUBSEQUENT TO DATE OF DISSOLUTION
OF THE PARTNERSHIP IN PRESERVING
THE MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET OF THE PARTNERSHIP IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The action is an equitable action, and contrary
to the argument of Appellant that the court had no
evidence to support its order, the court did hear evidence and had theretofore indicated to counsel that ·
it intended to award some compensation to Respondent for his having preserved the mortgage loan asset
of the partnership, and having retained jurisdiction :
of the case, the case having been tried piece meal,
the court exercised its equitable powers in entering ~
its order allowing compensation to Respondent for
his services rendered, particularly when the court
allowed compensation to be paid to Ruth Barlow and
R. L. Christensen to be charged as partnership expenses. Therefore an appeal from the ruling is not
in order, nor is the order appealed from an appealable order.
I

Appellant cannot come into a court of equity
and seek to avail himself of the benefits of that part
of an order beneficial to him and object to that part
of the order which is not beneficial to him, which
it is apparent Appellant seeks to do, this especially
when he is faced with the same omission, if there is
an omission, as that complained of. Here the comt
awarded, and charged against the partnership in·
come, the salary of a clerk whom Respondent had
discharged and who had been rehired by Appellant.
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1

after Respondent had stated to Appellant that if he
reemployed the party discharged Appellant would
be required to pay her salary; and a clerk whom Appellant brought into his employment to learn the
business, after dissolution, one who had never been
an employee of the partnership; none of this is supported by pleadings.
Respondent finds no fault with the authorities
cited and relied upon by Appellant, but they are not
applicable to this case.
Appellant points out the fact that the court
adopted the recommendation of Respondent in ordering that all income received by each party from
January 1, 1963 to February 1, 1964 is to be distributed in the same manner and as is provided by the
partnership agreement and as has heretofore been
received and distributed, and that neither partner
will receive any compensation for services during
this interim period. It is evident however that when
such recommendation was made by Respondent's
counsel it was assuming that the partnership agreement if invoked, would be invoked in all aspects.
This would require the consent of Respondent to the
employment of those not employed by the partnership. Thus Respondent would be protected and would
not be compelled to pay one-half the salary of such
employees. (See R. 83)
POINT TWO
THE ISSUE UPON WHICH THE AWARD
OF $2,500.00 TO THE RESPONDENT BY THE
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JUDGMENT OF JUNE 27, 1966 WAS TRIED ON
FEBRUARY 13, 1964, AND WAS ADJUDGED
AGAINST THE RESPONDENT BY THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 1964, WHICH JUDGMENT HAD BECOME FINAL AND WAS RES
JUDICATA OF SAID ISSUE AT THE TIME OF
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENTS OF NOVEMBER
9, 1964, AND OF JUNE 27, 1966. NO MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL OR MOTION TO BE RELIEVED OF SAID JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12,
1964, HAS EVER BEEN FILED, NOW NEARLY
THREE YEARS SINCE IT WAS ENTERED.

Appellant bases this argument on the ground
that the award made by the court to Respondent was
an issue, it was not made an issue by any pleading
but was simply an announcement by a court of
equity in its arriving at a settlement of a dispute
arising after the court had rendered judgment, and
when the court retained jurisdiction of the case to
settle the dispute. It is evident that Appellant would
take advantage of his having led Respondent into
believing that Appellant's net income was considerably more than Appellant later showed his net income to be, and in counsels reliance on such representation and counsels recommending to the court
that which he considered a fair division of income
and expenses, which recommendation the court
adopted. Respondent later found when the true facts
were made known, which facts were much different
from those represented by Appellant, that not only
would Respondent sustain a substantial loss from
participating in any income of Appellant but Respondent would expose his income to ridiculously

1
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high operation costs resulting in a much different
award than had been anticipated.
Appellant testified as to the fact as follows:
Altogether I've had $28,825.00 of total
appraisal work finished so that my income
for 1963 amounts to over $30,000.00, to Mr.
LeCheminant's $8,900.00. This is the problem
we each have half of that 50-50. But I have
against that some $10,000.00 personal expenses which I have paid. (R. 93)
Appellant did not deny having made such representations as is evidenced by the following testimony (R. 106, Vol. 2):

Q. Do you recall, Mr. Kiepe, in the trial
of this case the question arose as to what you
would estimate your income for 1963 and
January of '64, would be? And the expenditures against that for the earning of it? If I
remember correctly you stated that it would
be approximately $28,000.00 income with expenditures of about $10,000.00 against that?
A. Well, I remember being asked the question, and I did make some estimates, but now
I have the true and actual facts, item by
item.
In reliance on this representation, and assuming there would be close to $20,000.00 go into the
partnership account through Appellant's earnings,
the above referred to recommendation was made
by Respondent's counsel. It is evident that the court
<'onsidered there would be sufficient income realized
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by Respondent from Appellant's earnings to offset
any additional award which the court had therefore
indicated it would make to Respondent for his services in preserving the assets of the partnership represented by the mortgage loan business. The court
realizing the inequity resulting, and to correct this
inequitable situation stated that as it had retained
jurisdiction of the case it made the ward of $2,500.00.
The evidence shows the difficulty Respondent
faced in compelling Appellant to render an accounting of his earnings as ordered by the court, and in
Appellant, each time the matter was brought before
the court, furnishing a different account, finally
forcing Respondent to obtain an Order To Show
Cause.
POINT THREE
THE FINDING OF FACT CONTAINED IN
PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT
THAT EACH PARTY IS ENTITLED TO $535.00
BONUS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A WORD OF
PLEADINGS NOR BY ONE WORD OF EVIDENCE OR ANY OTHER PROOF, AND AS APPLIED IN THE JUDGMENT WOULD GIVE
RESPONDENT $535.00 TOO MUCH AND APPELLANT $535.00 TOO LITTLE.
This point is predicated entirely upon an accounting principal which the court considered. Appellant had, according to his accounting submitted,
received his revised bonuses over and above the 50%
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awarded in the original judgment and the court, in
order to place both parties on the same bonus basis
awarded this item to Respondent.
POINT FOUR
THAT PORTION OF PARAGRAPH 7 OF
THE JUDGMENT WHICH READS: "* * * AS
MODIFIED UNDER WHICH IT IS DETERMINED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO THE SUM OF $16,433.22 OUT OF
THE CASH ON HAND OF $28,723.98" IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The same is true of this item as that item under
Point III. This is arrived at out of the accounting
submitted not by Respondent but by Appellant. The
trial court being an accountant himself concluded
this was a correct interpretation of the account.
POINT FIVE
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT
OF MARCH 12, 1964.
Appellant is most inconsistent in his position
on the whole of this case, in arguing under Point II
that the award of $2,500.00 made by the court is
res adjudicata, then under this point Appellant
would go back of the judgment which was entered on
March 12, 1964, and he assigns as error the court's
refusal to correct that which appellant contends was
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a typographical mistake many months after th
judgment had been entered. True counsel for R~
spondent did state that if there were an error h
would consent to its being corrected, but after con
sulting with Respondent it was determined that n
error existed. The court did not refuse to correc
an apparent error as Appellant would have this Hon
orable court believe.
That which the court did was to suggest to coun
sel if an error appeared, to request the court to cm
rect same. Respondent found no error as chargec
POINT SIX

THE STATEMENT CONTAINED IN THl
TH IR D UNNUMBERED PARAGRAPH 01
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 01
LAW ARE FALSE AND ARE NOT SUPPORTEI
BY THE EVIDENCE.

Appellant charges Respondent with havini
falsely caused the court to make a finding that bot!
parties requested the court to retain jurisdiction o
the case to adjudicate the rights and obligation:
of each party during the thirteen month winding UJ
period. We submit that the record of the case clearl~
shows that the court did retain jurisdiction, that ni
objection to the offering of evidence was made b~
Appellant but on the contrary, Appellant took par
in the trial as the same applied to the winding llJ
period, all of which reflects the fact that the charg
of falsely stating facts as made by Appellant is mos
unfair.
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CROSS APPEAL OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order made and entered on November 9th, 1964 awarding Respondent
the sum of $2,500.00 for preserving the mortgage loan
assets of a partnership when Respondent had asked
for $5,000.00; from the award under said order of
compensation to Ruth Barlow and R. L. Christensen
as partnership expense; from a charge against Respondent of $400.00 ( 1h of $800.00) fee charged by
Appellant's accountant and in awarding Respondent
out of funds on hand the sum of $16,433.32 when
Respondent was entitled to an amount in excess of
said sum.
DISPOSITION OF CASE MADE IN
LOWER COURT
The lower court entered an Order on November
9th, 1964 which provided among other things:
1. That the Respondent be awarded $2,500.00
for "preserving the mortgage loan assets of the partnership."

2. That a bonus of $535.00 be awarded to each
of the parties.
3. Adjudging that the Respondent is entitled
to total credits of $20,101.93, less refunds of $3,668.71.
4. Adjudging that the Respondent is entitled
to net credits of $16,443.22.
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5. Adjudging that compensation paid to Ruth
Barlow and R. L. Christensen should be allowed as
partnership expense and be borne equally by the part.
ners.
6. Adjudging that the fee charged by Lawrence
S. Pinnock, Certified Public Accountant, should be a
partnership expense and borne equally by the partners.
7. Awarding Respondent a net balance credit
of $16,433.22 out of cash on hand of $28, 723.90.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL
Cross Appellant seeks reversal of the above portions of the Judgment or Order dated November 9,
1964 and judgment in his favor as follows, to-wit:

1. Awarding to Respondent (Cross Appellant)
the sum of $5,000.00 for Respondent's services in
preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partner- '
ship.
1

1

I

2. Adjudging that the compensation paid to ,
Ruth Barlow is not an expense of the partnership ;
and should be borne by Appellant.

3. Adjudging that the compensation paid to R. i
L. Christensen is not an expense of the partnership i
and should be borne by Appellant.
4. Adjudging that the fee paid Lawrence S.
Pinnock is not an expense of the partnership and
should be borne by Appellant.
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5. Awarding to Respondent out of the cash on
hand of the partnership, the sum of $22,093.22 being
the sum of $16,433.22 awarded, plus one-half the
compensation of Ruth Barlow of $2,550.00 or $1,275.00; one-half the compensation of R. L. Christensen of $2,970.00 or $1,485.00; one-half the fee paid
to Lawrence S. Pinnock of $800.00 or $400.00, and
an additional $2,500.00 for services in preserving
the mortgage loan asset of the partnership.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cross Appellant and Cross Respondent entered
into a written partnership agreement the business
of which partnership commenced under said agreement on October 1, 1943 (R. 3), which provided
among other things that each partner should work
for the partnership on a basis of a salesman's commission, which should be 50 % of any commissions
accruing from the listings, sale, rental, or appraisal
of real estate, or from insurance commissions. That
the partnership should be on a 50-50 basis as to
costs and profits. That disbursements from a joint
checking account shall be made over the signature
of both partners, and that neither partner will incur
an obligation in the name of the partnership in excess of $10.00 without first obtaining the approval
of the other partner. That the agreement as to percentage of division of commission was later orally
amended which is unimportant on this cross-appeal.
Cross Respondent served written notice of dissolution of the partnership upon Cross Appellant on
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December 30, 1962, to become effective February !
1, 1963. The partners continued to conduct business
at the same location, under the same firm name ·
with some of the same employees, sharing the part.'
nership office in the same manner after February
1, 1963 as before. Cross Appellant who had, prior
to dissolution for many years, managed the mortgage
loan business of the partnership, and who recognized
this business as an asset of the partnership, continued to manage this business of the partnership
in the same manner as he had done previous to the
dissolution, but Cross Respondent carried on his
appraisal business, spending no time whatsoever
in the mortgage loan business of the partnership;
this relationship continued for a period of thirteen
months after February 1, 1963. The parties were
unable to agree on a division of assets, and in the
winding up of the partnership business, as a result
Cross Respondent filed action against Cross Appellant for an accounting which resulted in a judgment
entered by the court on March 12, 1964. Neither
party to the action had by any pleading asked for
a determination of the rights of the parties during
the thirteen month period subsequent to the cutting
off date of the partnership as of February 1, 1963.
When the parties were unable to agree on an equitable division of income and expenses during this
thirteen month period the parties sought the aid
of the court to settle this controversy, which the comi
did and which resulted in the Order herein appealed
from.

1
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING
CROSS APPELLANT THE SUM OF $5,000.00
WHICH WAS THE SUM ASKED BY CROSS APPELLANT FOR HIS EFFORTS AND SERVICE
DURING THE LAST THIRTEEN MONTHS IN
PRESERVING THE MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET
OF THE PARTNERSHIP.
It is evident from the testimony of Cross Appellant that at the time notice of dissolution of the
partnership was served on him there was nearly
seven million dollars of mortgage loan business handled by Cross Appellant for the partnership; that
there were some 600 accounts which required some
service every month in order to keep the accounts
current. This business was carried on by Cross Appellant for the thirteen month period. As the mortgage loan account could have been cancelled by the
mortgage loan company because of the dissolution,
it was important that extra effort be made to service
these accounts in a creditable manner, which was
done by Cross Appellant.
As a result of the service performed by Cross
Appellant, this asset which it is evident was a very
valuable one was preserved. Cross Appellant testified in detail to the service rendered by him in
preserving this asset, ( R. 13-25, Vol. 2). Cross Respondent benefited through these services of Cross
Appellant and received his share of the profits from
this operation while at the same time Cross Re-
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spondent devoted the whole of his time to hiE
praisal business; not partnership business.

The sum of $5,000.00 asked for by Cross
pellant was most modest and should have beei
lowed by the court.

This case might be likened to one where irn
of Cross Respondent remaining in the same o
and conducting his private business therefron
takes a trip to Hawaii for a period of thii
months during which time Cross Appellant ca
on the partnership business. We think Cross
spondent would make no objection to an allow
by the court for Cross Appellant's services dt
that time. This case is no different. Or it is like
case where Cross Respondent might have died, Vi
his interest passes to his estate and Cross Appe
carries on the business. Such was the holding ii
case of Puffer v. Morton, 168 Wis. 366, 170
368, 5 ALR 1288 involving a law partnership "
one of the partners died and the firm had on :
no contingent fee cases but all business held 1
was on the usual general retainer basis wher
clients could have dispensed with the servicf
the firm. The court said :

Neither can it be said that the condrn
to a conclusion of law business on hand a
time of the death of a partner is simJ
winding up of the partnership. It is more
that, it is a continuation of business afte
partnership has ceased to exist. Often
continuation may require years of hard,
for completion. Hence it is not equitable
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the estate of a deceased partner which has
contributed nothing towards such work should
share in its compensation. Citing Rowell v.
Rowell, 122 Wis. 1, 99 N.W. 473.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COMPENSATION PAID TO RUTH BARLOW AS A
PARTNERSHIP EXPENSE TO BE B 0 RN E
EQUALLY BY THE PARTNERS. THIS ITEM
AMOUNTS TO THE SUM OF $2,550.00.
Cross Appellant discharged Ruth Barlow shortly before February 1, 1963, and after some period
of time Cross Respondent rehired her. It is evident
from the testimony in the record that Ruth Barlow
devoted the greater part of her time not to partnership business, but in reviewing records and accounts
in an effort to make out a case against Cross Appellant on behalf of Cross Respondent. Her services
were not needed by the partnership, neither were
her services required in the winding up of the business of the partnership. At the time Cross Respondent rehired Ruth Barlow, Cross Appellant told Cross
Respondent that if he hired Ruth, Cross Appellant
would be required to pay her salary, that Cross Appellant would not, nor would he consent to the
partnership paying same. Even when Cross Appellant signed salary checks for Ruth Barlow he
advised Cross Respondent that he would look to the
amount to come out of and be charged to the account
of Cross Respondent.
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The evidence shows by Exhibit 22, that on February 5, 1963, Cross Appellant addressed a letter to
Cross Respondent which is in part as follows:

Now concerning Ruth. I will not agree to
increasing the overhead in any way during
the period of the partnership dissolution. I '
told Ruth the day she went to the hospital of
the dissolution and that I would call her as
soon as this problem was resolved. At the pres- ,
ent time we do not need more than a part time i
girl. Linda is doing in a half day all the work
done by Ruth in a full day. If you insist on
rehiring Ruth before the dissolution is com- i
plete you should pay her salary. I invoke the
terms of the partnership agreement on this
point.
1

1

If we apply the provisions of Section 48-1-27 ;

UCA 1953 which is as follows:

PARTNERSHIP NOT TERMINATED BY
DISSOLUTION.
On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up
of partnership affairs is completed.
Cross Respondent had no right to reemploy Ruth
Barlow inasmuch as the provisions of the partner·
ship agreement continued in force until dissolution
under the above quoted section.
The partnership agreement as to the right t-0
incur obligations by eithe1· partner on behalf of the
partnership provides that neither partner will incur
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an obligation in the name of the partnership in excess of $10.00, without obtaining the approval of the
other partner.
If it should be contended that the partnership
agreement is not in force after dissolution and during the winding up period, then Cross Respondent
cannot claim this item as an expense inasmuch as
Cross Respondent had not shown in any respect that
Ruth Barlow's services were required in the winding up process of the partnership, or to complete
transactions begun but not finished as provided by
Section 48-1-30 UCA 1953 which read as follows:
Except as far as may be necessary to wind
up partnership affairs or to complete transactions begun but not then finished, d'issolution
terminates all authority of any partner to act
for the partnership.
Therefore Cross Respondent cut off all authority to employ Ruth Barlow or anyone else, unless
agreed to by Cross Appellant, by his having served
notice of dissolution on Cross Appellant.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COMMISSION PAID TOR. L. CHRISTENSEN AS A
PARTNERSHIP EXPENSE TO BE BORNE
EQUALLY BY THE PARTNERS, THIS ITEM
AMOUNTS TO THE SUM OF $2,970.00.
R. L. Christensen was never an employee of the
partnership. He was employed by Cross Respondent
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subsequent to dissolution to learn the business. It is
evident that Mr. Christensen did not take the place
of another employee of the partnership and the record contains not a word of evidence that the services .
of Mr. Christensen were necessary in the winding up 1
of the business of the partnership. Cross Respondent ,
was never consulted nor did he at any time consent
to the employment of Mr. Christensen.
1

1

For the same reasons as argued under Point II,
this charge against the partnership is not proper.

t

There are no pleadings or findings to support I
either this award or that under Point II.
i
POINT IV
I

THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING THE •
FEE OF LAWREN CE S. PINNOCK, CERTIFIED 1
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, AS A PARTNERSHIP
E X P E N S E , PAID FROM PARTNERSHIP
FUNDS AND BORNE EQUALLY BY THE PART··
NERS. THIS ITEM AMOUNTS TO THE SUM i
OF $800.00.
I
After Cross Appellant had objected to several
accountings furnished to Cross Respondent, Cross
Respondent engaged the services of Mr. Pinnock to
examine accounts, not of the partnership, or of Cross
Appellant, but accounts, items of which reflected the
earnings of Cross Respondent during the thirteen
month period subsequent to the February 1, 1963
date. Cross Appellant did not consent to, nor did he
agree at any time that he would pay any part of

I

•
1

,
,

·
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the fee paid to Mr. Pinnock. For the same reasons
as relied upon under Points II and III this is not
a proper charge against the partnership.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING
THAT CROSS APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO
RECEIVE THE SUM OF $16,433.22 OUT OF THE
CASH ON HAND OF $28, 723.98.
This item results in the assumption that the
Cross Appeal of Cross Appellant will be favorable
to Cross Appellant on all points relied upon, in which
case the award to Cross Appellant should be $22,093.22 and not the sum of $16,433.22 awarded to
Cross Appellant by the Order appealed from.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent and Cross Appellant submits
that the law and the evidence requires:
That the Order appealed from by Appellant be
affirmed except as to those Points on which Cross
Appellant assigns as errors in the following particulars:
(a) That Cross Appellant be awarded the sum
of $5,000.00 for services rendered by him in the
preservation of the mortgage loan asset of the partnPrshi p.
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(b) That the allowance of compensation paid
to Ruth Barlow as a partnership expense to be borne
equally by the partners be set aside.
( c) That the allowance of compensation paid to
R. L. Christensen as a partnership expense to be
borne equally by the partners be set aside.
( d) That the allowance of fee of Lawrence S.
Pinnock, as a partnership expense be set aside.
( e) That the finding that Cross Appellant is
entitled to receive the sum of $16,433.22 out of the
cash on hand of $28, 723.98 be set aside, and that
Cross Appellant be awarded the sum of $22,093.22
out of said sum.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, BACKMAN
AND CLARK
1111 Deseret Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent
and Cross Appellant

